This survey paper explores the literature on decoupling of farm programs that has emerged in the last 10 years. The paper identifies and assesses the various channels of potential coupling of decoupled farm payments and provides taxonomy of coupling mechanisms found in theoretical and empirical papers. Coupling of decoupled payments is pervasive but effects when measurable are small, with the exception of the impact on land values. The paper points to unresolved issues on potential coupling mechanisms for further research.
Introduction
Domestic subsidies to agriculture were brought under the discipline of global trade rules for the first time in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994. Member countries of the WTO decided to reduce the distortions that were caused by current levels of domestic farm subsidies. Under the URAA, domestic support is classified into three categories or "boxes" according to their impact on international trade. The amber-box contains the most distorting subsidies, which are therefore required to be limited in use. The blue-box payments also cause some distortion but are required to be production limiting. The green-box contains subsidies that cause no or minimal distortion. The subsidies in the blue-and green-boxes are excluded from all WTO disciplines.
To reduce trade distortions caused by these farm subsidies, members were required to shift towards decoupled income support while reducing coupled support. Decoupled support policies are categorized as green-box payments. They are defined as payments that are financed by taxpayers and are not related to current production, factor use, or prices, and for which eligibility criteria are defined by a fixed, historical base period. Since they are exempt from WTO disciplines, decoupled payments have become an important part of income support that is provided to agriculture, especially in industrialized countries. Green-box payments are likely to be central to the round following the Doha round. This evolution of the WTO agricultural negotiations is happening in the context of recent WTO rulings against Canadian dairy, EU sugar and U.S. cotton policies, all three shown to be distorting and inconsistent with WTO obligations. The U.S. cotton dispute also put the U.S. direct payments inclusion in the green-box into question although the latter were not initially a focus of the dispute. Many countries with large farm programs are pushing their own interest groups to consider less coupled policies or decoupled policies fitting under generously-defined blue-and green-boxes under a new WTO agreement at the conclusion of the Doha round. The policy debate has led to various claims and conjectures to explain the link between decoupled payments and production decisions and market outcomes (Aksoy and Beghin (2004) ). The economics profession has recently addressed and delineated many of these potential links, both with analytical conceptualizations and empirical investigations. This survey paper distills the recent literature on decoupling of farm programs in the last 10 years. It first describes the ambiguity surrounding "decoupling" and then assesses the various channels of potential coupling of decoupled farm payments and provides taxonomy of coupling mechanisms found in theoretical and empirical papers. The majority of the papers reviewed find that decoupled payments affect the decision making process of farmers, though most effects are small in magnitude. The paper identifies unresolved issues on "coupling mechanisms" for further research. The following programs have been considered in this paper: the production flexibility contract (PFC) payments from the 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act which have been continued as direct payments in the 2002 Farm Security and Rural Investment (FSRI) Act and the counter-cyclical payments (CCP) in the United States, and the CAP area payments in the EU. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides two important definitions of decoupled payments and identifies the coupling mechanisms of decoupled payments. Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 review the recent literature, classifying papers by the specific mechanism. Section 9 concludes.
Definition of Decoupled Payments and Coupling Mechanisms
Two prominent definitions of "decoupled" payments are based on the URAA (as defined in Annex 2.6) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The URAA defines decoupling in terms of policy design as taxpayer financed payments satisfying the following criteria: (i) Eligibility for such payments shall be determined by clearly defined criteria such as income, status as a producer or landowner, factor use or production level in a defined and fixed base period. (ii) The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, the type or volume of production (including livestock units) undertaken by the producer in any year after the base period. (iii) The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, the prices, domestic or international, applying to any production undertaken in any year after the base period. (iv)
The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, the factors of production employed in any year after the base period. (v) No production shall be required in order to receive such payments.
The OECD defines decoupling in terms of policy effects (Cahill (1997) ). A policy is fully decoupled if "it does not influence production decisions of farmers receiving payments." Beyond unchanged market equilibrium, market adjustment to any exogenous shocks should not be affected either. Both the shape and the position of supply and demand curves remain unchanged. A less restrictive concept, effectively fully decoupled, means that equilibrium levels of production and trade are unchanged but that the shape of the demand and supply curves can change.
While some payments may narrowly satisfy the URAA definition, they potentially have some allocative ("coupling") effects, which arise with uncertainty, imperfect credit, land and labor markets and farmer expectations about future payments. In the presence of uncertainty, decoupled payments reduce risk aversion and the degree of risk. If credit markets are imperfect, decoupled payments have the potential to increase the liquidity of creditconstrained farmers. The payments also increase land values and rents, which also improves the credit worthiness of credit-constrained farmers and provides incentives to retain land in agriculture. Decoupled payments affect labor markets by influencing the on-and off-farm labor supply decisions. Decoupled payments affect farmer expectations by linking current decisions to future payments. Next, we review each coupling mechanism. Tables 1-6 summarize the mechanisms, the evidence of their magnitude when available, and associated authors.
Coupling through Risk
If farmers' preferences display decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), increases in wealth imply a reduction in the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (wealth effect).
Decoupled payments also reduce the degree of risk faced by farmers by reducing income variability (insurance effect) (Hennessy, 1998 ). Hennessy models a risk-averse farmer, maximizing expected utility from profit. The farmer earns stochastic profit from the market, which is augmented by a decoupled payment. The farmer's objective function is given by:
where α is the farmer's choice variable, ˆ( , ) π α ε is the sum of stochastic market returns,
π α ε and decoupled support payment, ( , DP ) ϕ ε . Under the conditions that (i) farmer's preferences display DARA, (ii) the risk faced by the farmer reduces his optimal level of the choice variable ( ( , ) π α ε > 0), (iii) support augmented income increases with risk
and, (iv) the decoupled payment reduces the risk faced by the farmer ϕ ε ≤ , the optimal choice of the farmer increases with the magnitude of support.
The author also shows that under constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and conditions (ii), (iii) and, (iv), the optimal choice of the farmer increases with the magnitude of support. In this case, wealth effects are absent; the optimal choice is only influenced by insurance effects due to the reduced income variability induced by the increase in support. Hennessy conducts numerical analysis for a continuous corn producer in the Midwest to obtain some measure of the magnitudes of the wealth and insurance effects of a target price program based on fixed yield. Monte Carlo simulations indicate that an increase in the magnitude of support could increase nitrogen use by a maximum of 15 %, while the increase in output is small (a maximum of 2.75%). Insurance effects are much larger than wealth effects. To ensure that decoupled payments do not have any insurance effects, Hennessy suggests that these payments should not vary with the source of uncertainty. Sckokai and Moro (2006) have findings similar to Hennessy's. They use data from the Italian Farm Accounting Data Network to empirically evaluate the risk effects of the recent CAP reforms in the EU. It is assumed that risk arises due to uncertain prices and that farmers display constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences. The estimated model is then used to simulate the effects of recent CAP reforms (reduced intervention prices compensated by an increase in cereal area payments and eventually SFP). Supplies of all arable crops are positively influenced by own area payments. The elasticity of crop acreage with respect to area payments is positive for all arable crops. The introduction of the non-stochastic SFP reduces income variability and offsets the impact of the increased price variability. Risk effects are decomposed into insurance and wealth effects. Additionally the policy change has price and payment effects which offset each other; while the wealth effects are positive but small, insurance effects are more important in determining the direction of the output effect of the policy change.
Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder (2000) study the linkage between decoupled payments and production in the United States, Canada, and Mexico under uncertainty. They apply a three country computable general equilibrium model (CGE) in which the effect of the decoupled payment on production is captured through a change in the risk premium. Using 1997 data, they look at PFC in the United States, National Income Stabilization Accounts 
where LR is the commodity loan rate, p is the stochastic output price, E(M) is expected income, V(M) is the variance of income, R r is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and ' C is marginal cost. The second term in brackets captures the price risk premium. The incentive price is defined as the expected price given the truncation of the price distribution at the loan rate less the price risk premium. A policy that decreases the price risk premium increases the incentive price and has a positive effect on production. Computing the price risk premium under normally distributed prices, the authors evaluate the risk related incentives for major commodities expressed as a percentage of the market price of the commodity. The assumed value of R r matters but effects are overall small. The CCP program created risk-related effects in the magnitude of 0.9% for sorghum, 1.5% for corn and 1.9% for wheat. Serra et al. (2005a) analyze the impact of decoupled payments on production decisions taken at both the intensive and extensive levels in the presence of price uncertainty.
The model assumes that farmers have two sources of income: market revenue from sales of a single output and decoupled payments (DP). The farmer maximizes expected utility from wealth. The analysis is based on the assumption of DARA. In a related paper, Serra et al. (2006) analyze the impact that decoupled payments have on production by explicitly considering the effect that inputs have on output variability when farmers face both output and price risk. For the single output, single input model, an increase in DP increases (decreases) the demand for the input if the farmer's preferences display DARA (Increasing absolute risk aversion) and the input is risk increasing. This happens because the impact of DP on input use is determined by an interaction between the wealth effect (caused by the change in the coefficient of risk aversion brought about by a change in wealth) and the effect of the input on output variability. If the input is risk decreasing, the effect of DP on input use is indeterminate. The effect of an increase in price on input demand is also indeterminate. Using a model with three inputs (pesticides, fertilizers, and seeds and fuel oil) and the data of Serra et al. (2005) , the authors find that all inputs are risk increasing and that farmers in the sample exhibit DARA preferences. DP corresponding to acreage elasticities of 0.0317 for corn, 0.0204 for soybeans and 0.0428 for wheat. MLA effects on corn acreage are found to be stronger as compared to the effect of PFC payments, though the effect on soybeans and wheat are not significant. PFC payments lead to less land idling, but no significant impact on land transactions. Table 1 summarizes this section.
Coupling via Credit Constraints
Decoupled payments can influence the investment decision of farmers by adding to their wealth, which might enable farmers to save more and therefore increase their investment. For capital-constrained farmers, decoupled payments improve their credit worthiness and make credit more accessible. Roe, Somwaru, and Diao (2003) Aggregate agricultural production increases by a maximum of 0.18% over the benchmark, a very small effect. All these effects occur in the short run. In the long run, the differences in the rental rates of capital in agriculture and outside agriculture are arbitraged away and there is convergence to the benchmark. Thus, PFC payments do not have any effects in the long run. Table 2 recapitulates this section's information.
Coupling through Labor Allocation
Decoupled payments, by affecting the wealth of farmers, also affect their labor-leisure choice which can have production effects. Most U.S. operators and their family members contribute at least two thirds of the labor used by farms, and at least one family member works off-farm (Ahearn, El-Osta and Dewbre, 2006). Decoupled payments can have a significant effect on farmers' on-farm and off-farm labor supply decisions. The latter authors investigate the effect of government payments on the off-farm labor participation decision of farm operator households using ARMS data for the years 1996 and 1999 and a bivariate probit approach.
They find that PFC, LDP, and MLA payments, individually and in aggregate, reduce the farmer's likelihood to work off the farm. The estimation results for the spouse are inconclusive.
In an investigation also based on recent ARMS data, Dewbre and Mishra (2002) estimate the effect that PFC, MLA, and LDP and disaster assistance payments have on the leisure time and on-farm hours of operators and spouses. The impact of the PFC payments on on-farm labor hours is negative and statistically insignificant. PFC payments have a positive and significant impact on leisure hours though the effect is very small in magnitude. The authors conclude that PFC payments are decoupled. The authors also focus on transfer efficiency losses arising from reallocation of farm resources caused by the government payments and leakages of benefits to non-farming landowners. Transfer efficiency is measured as the impact of the payments on the total income of households. PFC has the lowest transfer efficiency (0.29) for households with some off-farm income amongst the payments considered and also the highest transfer efficiency (0.55) for households with no off-farm income.
El-Osta, Mishra and Ahearn (2004) estimate the effect of PFC, LDP, and disaster assistance payments on on-and off-farm labor and total labor supply models using 2001 ARMS data. They find that combined payments have a positive effect on on-farm and total labor hours supplied and a negative effect on off-farm labor supply. Operators increased their on-farm labor hours while cutting down on both off-farm labor as well as leisure time. When each government payment is considered individually, PFC payments have a positive significant impact on on-farm labor hours and a negative significant impact on off-farm labor hours. No significant effect is found on total labor supply. Table 3 sums up the points made by these papers.
Coupling via Land Markets
Decoupled payments are passed on to landowners via higher land rents and land values. This can lead to land remaining in agriculture and also as mentioned earlier can make credit more accessible to farmers. Roe, Somwaru and Diao (2003) indicated that PFC payments lead to an increase in land values, even in the long run. One of the earliest articles to raise this issue was Schertz and Johnston (1998) . The authors conduct a study in four major agricultural regions:
the Great Plains, the Corn Belt, the South and California. The study is based on the responses of farm managers or operators to the 1996 FAIR Act. Based on their discussions with the farm managers the authors conclude that owing to their non-stochastic nature, PFC payments inflate land prices and land rents. PFC payments increase land values as they are attached to the land. In the case of cash leases much of the payments pass on to the landowner via increased rents. In the case of crop share leases, payments create incentives for the landowner to adjust the lease to take advantage of the PFC payments (for example in some cases landowners shifted to cash leases). Gohin, Guyomard, and le Mouel (2000) analyze the impact of direct payments on land and production. They evaluate them in terms of their eligibility to qualify as green-box payments. They use a static partial equilibrium model with two perfectly competitive agricultural sectors, each producing a single output, with a constant returns to scale production technology. Production in the two sectors depends on the use of three inputs: an aggregate variable input, a specific primary factor, and a fixed allocable factor such as land, which is used in both sectors and is in fixed supply. The domestic support instruments considered include output subsidies, variable input subsidies, and DP based on the specific factor, and on land. This is because the coupled payments can increase production and therefore increase the demand for other non-land inputs. Thus, benefits from the coupled payments maybe transferred to other inputs and not all benefits are capitalized into higher land values. PFC payments are paid on land, and being lump-sum in nature, they are not expected to influence production. Hence, all benefits from the PFC payments are expected to be capitalized into higher land values. This is in contrast to the results in Goodwin, Mishra and Ortalo-Magne Within the area payments, the one requiring no active production has a smaller effect on trade than the one which requires mandatory production. Market price supports have a smaller impact on trade as compared to the input subsidies. In fact, input subsidies prove to be the most inefficient form of support in terms of providing income support while area payments prove to be the most efficient. are reduced by 90%, the slaughter premium on adult animals is reduced by 80% and the suckler cow premium and the special beef premium are reduced by 50% and 90%
respectively. It is also assumed that the SFP has no market effects. The simulation results indicate that under both assumptions, land rents decrease by at least 80%. There are also negative impacts on arable crop and beef production. The results with the first assumption are similar to the other studies: soft wheat and beef production decrease by 1.6% and 3.6%
respectively. The results with the second assumption are in the same direction but the magnitude of the impact differs with a decrease of 7.3% in soft wheat production and a 1.2% decrease in beef production. The varying results suggest that the impacts of the CAP MTR are sensitive to the modeling of the Agenda 2000 direct payments. Another conclusion that can be drawn from the results of the alternative modeling of the Agenda 2000 arable crop direct payments is that the payments seem to have a moderate degree of coupling. Table 4 recaps these papers on coupling through land markets.
Coupling from Farmer Expectations on Future Policy Changes

Lagerkvist and Olson (2002) analyze anticipatory adjustments made by farmers to the 1996
FAIR Act using a sample of Minnesota farmers. Both the timing and the size of the support are considered to be stochastic. The farmer has well defined probability distribution functions for the timing and the size of the reform. The farmer maximizes net receipts subject to a binding dividend constraint derived from the budget constraint of the farm business.
Assuming that the farmer continuously updates his information, the authors convert the dynamic stochastic problem into two deterministic control problems for the pre-reform and post-reform periods. The solution indicates that the pre-reform debt-to-asset ratio differs from the post-reform ratio. The former includes an additional term which captures the anticipatory optimal debt adjustment to a future reform of farm policy. The adjustment comprises of the expectation effect (relating to the uncertainty in the size of the reform) and the timing effect 06 is weakly-increasing in the subjective probability of base update. They also find that the maximum percent increase in acreage is 6% whereas the change averaged over all price states and subjective probabilities is approximately 3%. In sum, the effects through expectations appear tangible although small. Table 5 presents the summary for these papers on expectations.
Other Coupling Linkages and Allocative Effects
A few papers do not fit in the conceptual underpinnings of the previous taxonomy. Guyomard, Le Mouel, and Gohin (2004) compare the effectiveness of four support mechanisms (an output subsidy, a land subsidy, and decoupled payments with, DPm, and without mandatory production, DP) on achieving four policy objectives: providing income support, increasing the number of farmers, reducing the negative externalities from non-land input usage and keeping trade effects at a minimum. A support mechanism is considered to be more efficient than the other support mechanisms, if for the same budgetary costs, it has a higher impact on the four policy objectives mentioned above. The analytical model is based on three equilibrium equations representing equilibrium in the output and land markets and an entry-exit condition. DP does not appear in any of the three equations. It only achieves the policy objective of providing income support. DPm on the other hand has a positive effect on the number of farmers, though its effect on output price and land price is ambiguous. The authors find that none of the four policy instruments dominate in terms of efficiency in all the four policy goals. DP is most efficient when it comes to supporting farmers' income with the least distortion of trade. Land subsidies are the most efficient in reducing the negative externalities from non-land input use while decoupled payments with mandatory production are the most efficient in maintaining or increasing the number of farmers.
Chau and de Gorter (2005) examine the effects of decoupled payments on exit decisions of farmers. It is their contention that decoupled payments subsidize production and at times cross-subsidize exports. In the model set up by the authors, producers receive both coupled and decoupled support. The coupled payment is modeled as an ad-valorem subsidy, which is incorporated in the price they receive for exports. The decoupled payment is a lumpsum payment DP. The producers incur fixed costs which are firm specific and variable costs.
The model results indicate that DP allows producers to cover fixed costs, thereby allowing those with higher fixed costs to remain in production, who would have exited otherwise. Thus DP do not affect an individual producer's output, rather it affects aggregate output and exports by influencing the exit decision of producers. The model is calibrated to 1998 U.S.
wheat production to compare the effects of PFC payments and the coupled LDP payments.
Fixed costs are assumed to be normally distributed. In the long run when it is possible to exit, the removal of PFC payments causes 3% of the producers to exit, leading to a reduction in output and exports. Serra et al. (2005b) examine the effect that decoupling of support has on the environment by analyzing the effect of post-MacSharry CAP reforms on the use of pest control inputs in the cereal, oilseed and protein crop (COP) sector. The model specifies damage abatement functions to capture the contribution of the pest control inputs in reducing crop damage. The authors derive expressions for the elasticity of the demand of pest control inputs with respect to price support measures and per hectare compensatory payments. They hypothesize and find that the input response to DP is less than their response to price, using a sample of French farms from the Farm Accounting Data Network for the period 1994-1999.
The model is then shocked with CAP reforms (decrease in cereal intervention prices, and increase in area payments). Area payments for oilseeds and protein crops are reduced. These policy changes result in a reduction in the use of crop protection inputs by a little more than 3%, and a shift away from oilseed/protein crops acreage towards cereal acreage. When area payments are combined into the SFP, the use of crop protection inputs is reduced by 11%.
Cereal acreage falls while oilseeds and protein crops acreage remains almost constant. Table   6 summarizes these last papers.
Conclusion
There has been a move towards decoupled support away from coupled support consistent with the 1994 URAA, a positive development. However, as seen above, decoupled payments do influence farmers' decisions. Our review identifies five major coupling channels of decoupled payments: (i) they affect the risk faced by farmers, either by reducing their level of risk aversion (wealth effects) or by reducing the risk they face (insurance effects), (ii) they ease credit constraints faced by farmers, (iii) they affect the labor allocation decisions of farm households, (iv) they alter land values, rents and land prices, and (v) they influence farmers decisions through expectations about future payments. Less often mentioned, decoupled payments can also influence the entry and exit decisions of farmers and have some effect on the environment by influencing input usage.
Although decoupled payments are not "decoupled" as they influence farmer decisions via the channels identified above, the magnitude of these impacts was found to be small in most cases. One exception is with respect to land markets. Since most decoupled payments (be it the PFC, direct payments or the CAP area payments) are land based and non-stochastic, they are capitalized into higher land values which increase land rents and prices. This feature could lead to land remaining in agricultural use rather than being converted into alternate uses. Wealth effects though positive are small in magnitude and insurance effects are more important than wealth effects in determining the impact of decoupled payments. Decoupled payments also influence crop choice, since the payments vary by crops, and some crops are not eligible to receive payments.
An important and unresolved issue is to know the cumulative impact of these individually small effects coming from each coupling mechanism. Could it be that when combined together, risk aversion, wealth effects, credit constraints, expectations, and linkages through input markets have a substantial impact on production?
Decoupled payments have been a right step in reducing the distortions caused by domestic farm subsidies, but there is scope for further decoupling. This can be achieved by changing eligibility requirements in some cases (for example removing the restriction that fruits and vegetables are not eligible for payments in the case of direct payments in the United States), by requiring eligibility to be satisfied at the farm level (for example area payments in the CAP have base acreage restriction at the national or regional level, which still creates incentives at the farm level to increase acreage) and by ensuring that the eligibility to receive payments do not change after the inception of the decoupled payment program.
The implementation of decoupled programs also calls into question the current definition of the green-box payments in the WTO. There is a need for reevaluating the eligibility criteria of the green box payments. Right now eligibility criteria do not take into account the farmer's response under uncertainty, or that the impact of similarly designed programs can differ across countries, and even across sectors within a country (Gohin, Guyomard and le Mouel (2000) ). Also some eligibility criteria are ambiguous (for example it is not specified if eligibility criteria should be satisfied at the farm level, at the sub-sectoral level or at the sectoral level). For payments to be truly decoupled, the WTO has to reevaluate green-box criteria and ensure that there is no room for ambiguities. Acreage is aggregate U.S. acreage of 7 crops receiving P F C payments; corn, grain sorghum, oats, barley, wheat, upland cotton and rice.
e The incentive price is defined as the truncated expected price (truncation of the price distribution at the loan rate) less the price risk premium. The CCP payments reduce the risk premium which increases the incentive price of commodities.
f Output is a quantity index that includes wheat, corn, grain sorghum and soybeans. This definition of output also applies to Serra et al. (2006) .
h LS represents Least Squares. The acreage elasticities here include the effect of the P F C payments on the level of risk aversion and on the financial leverage of the farm. In the paper the coefficients on the P F C-insurance and P F C-(debt to asset ratio) interaction terms are found to be statistically insignificant.
b Following . The paper assumes that $6.11bn is paid to farmers as P F C payments in 1997 and that these payments are made in each period of time from 1997 in perpetuity.
These effects occur in the short run and are compared to the baseline model (without P F C payments).
b See footnote a on page 31. The elasticity was calculated for farmers who had some off-farm work. The elasticity was calculated for farmers who had no off-farm work.
c
The on-farm work hours model was estimated for farmers who had some off-farm work. The area payment requires that land be in arable use. The paper also considers area payments which require mandatory production. The results here provide a lower bound. The production and trade impact ratios measure the effect on production and trade of a given change in support provided by area payments relative to the estimated impact on production and trade of the same monetary change in market price support. f The paper assumes that $6.11 bn is paid to farmers as P F C payments in 1997 and that these payments are made in each period of time from 1997 in perpetuity.
g GTAP stands for Global Trade Analysis Project.
h Land idling refers to the number of acres not harvested. An alternative measure of land idling used was the number of acres not cropped. The elasticity for this measure was -0.16. Conditional on price equal to $2.125/bu and the farmer's subjective probability about the expected base update equal to 1. Acreage is the aggregate acreage of 7 crops across 11 states.
c DP is decoupled payment without mandatory production and DP m is decoupled payment with mandatory production. The elasticity derived here does not include the effect of P F C payments on the risk-averse nature of farmers or on credit constraints faced by farmers. In the paper these effects are defined to be the "direct" effects of the P F C payments.
